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Deborah Jones Merritt*
Do professionals have an ethical obligation to educate new
members of their profession? The ancient Hippocratic oath
recognized such a commitment, requiring all doctors "to give a share
of precepts and oral instruction and all the other learning ... to
pupils who have signed the covenant."' Contemporary theories of
professionalism point to the same result, identifying
intergenerational education as an essential feature of professional
status.2 Moral theory and economic policy underscore this outcome:
in return for the exclusive right to practice a profession, established
members of the profession must agree to share their knowledge,
skills, and other expertise with newcomers.3
Sadly, the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers do
not mention this duty to educate.4 Equally unfortunate, mounting
evidence suggests that neither law schools nor the practicing bar are
fulfilling their ethical obligation to educate new members of the
profession.5 This Article explores that ethical gap and considers
ways law schools could restore their ethical commitment to educate
new members of the bar. To provide background, Part I of the
Article examines the historical, social, moral, and economic roots of
a professional obligation to educate. Part II analyzes the status of
this obligation within the legal profession. Finally, Part III proposes
six ways legal educators can advance our ethical commitment to
educating new lawyers.
I. FOUNDATIONS
What is a profession? Scholars have long struggled to answer
that question. Full examination of that scholarship is beyond the
scope of this Article, but I offer below some representative
* John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, Moritz College of
Law, The Ohio State University.
1. LuDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 3 (Ludwig Edelstein trans.,
1943); see also infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Parts I.C, I.D.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
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perspectives drawn from history, the sociology of the professions,
moral theory, and economic principles. Notably, all of these sources
agree that a duty to educate new members lies at the heart of
professional status.
A. The Hippocratic Oath
In Western cultures, the Hippocratic oath is one of the oldest
and most enduring images of professional identity.6 The ancient
Greek physician Hippocrates-or perhaps one of his students-
authored the oath to summarize a doctor's ethical duties to patients,
colleagues, and the community.7 Although popular discussions of
the Hippocratic oath focus on the doctor-patient relationship, the
oath also specifies the doctor's relationship to the professional
community. In the oath's quaint terms, a doctor swears:
To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my parents
and to live my life in partnership with him, and if he is in need
of money to give him a share of mine, and to regard his
offspring as equal to my brothers in male lineage and to teach
them this art-if they desire to learn it-without fee and
covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction and
all the other learning to my sons and to the sons of him who
has instructed me and to pupils who have signed the covenant
and have taken an oath according to the medical law, but to no
one else.8
This covenant includes four interwoven components. First, the
new doctor affirms that the medical profession is a tightly bound
community with internal obligations as strong as those that bind
family. Second, building on this familial metaphor, the doctor
promises to uphold the community's intergenerational duties,
honoring predecessors and teaching successors. Third, the oath
taker acknowledges that these duties may require financial
sacrifice. The new doctor swears to support a mentor in financial
need and to teach the mentor's offspring "without fee and
covenant."9 Finally, the doctor vows to limit her teaching to "pupils
who have signed the covenant and taken an oath."10 This promise
draws a sharp line between the medical community and all others.
6. See, e.g., V.I. Bakshtanovskii & Iu. V. Sogomonov, Professional Ethics:
Sociological Perspectives, 46 Soc. RES. 75, 75 (2007) ("Just about the first image
that comes to our mind in connection with an expression like 'professional
ethics (morality)' is the Hippocratic oath."). For a recent discussion of the oath's
history, see Lisa R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: A Dialogue
Between Law and Medicine, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 299, 301-05
(2002).
7. Hasday, supra note 6, at 301.
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Modern versions of the Hippocratic oath describe the doctor's
obligation to the professional community less effusively, but most
include some reference to educating other members of the
profession. One of the most popular updates, created by Dr. Louis
Lasagna in 1964, includes this promise: "I will respect the hard-won
scientific gains of those physicians in whose steps I walk, and gladly
share such knowledge as is mine with those who are to follow."1 A
more recent iteration, produced by the Weill Cornell Medical
College, requires graduates to make the following vow: "That just as
I have learned from those who preceded me, so will I instruct those
who follow me in the science and the art of medicine."'
12
After reviewing these and other oaths, a contemporary medical
expert concluded that one of the "cardinal points" of medical oaths is
"[a] statement that teaching those who come after us as well as our
colleagues and learning from them ... shall have an equal standing
as does patient care today."13 The American Medical Association's
concise Principles of Medical Ethics includes the same commitment.
One of the nine principles declares: "A physician shall continue to
study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge, maintain a
commitment to medical education, [and] make relevant information
available to... colleagues... ."14 Both the Hippocratic oath and
modern medical codes thus acknowledge the essential role of
intergenerational education in a profession.
B. Sociology of the Professions
A subfield of sociology examines the characteristics and social
status of professionals.'5  Sociologists in this field agree that
professionals demonstrate at least three characteristics: they apply
11. Harold C. Sox, The Ethical Foundations of Professionalism: A
Sociological History, 131 CHEST 1532, 1540 (2007) (reprinting the Lasagna oath
as an appendix). Lasagna wrote the oath for students graduating from Tufts
University's School of Medicine. It spread from there to numerous other
schools.
12. Erich H. Loewy, Oaths for Physicians-Necessary Protection or
Elaborate Hoax?, MEDSCAPE (2007), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle
/550118_3. The Cornell oath also retains the concept of succoring other
members of the profession: "I will honor the Profession of medicine, be just and
generous to its members, and help sustain them in their service to humanity."
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Osteopaths recognize a similar commitment in their version of the
Hippocratic oath. That oath currently includes these words: "I will look with
respect and esteem upon all those who have taught me my art. To my college I
will be loyal and strive always for its best interests and for the interests of the
students who will come after me." Osteopathic Oath, AM. OSTEOPATHIC AsS'N,
http://www.osteopathic.org/inside-aoa/about/leadership/Pages/osteopathicoath
.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
15. See generally Julia Evetts, Short Note: The Sociology of Professional
Groups, 54 CURRENT Soc. 133 (2006).
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specialized bodies of knowledge, maintain complex educational
systems to convey that knowledge, and impart ethical codes as part
of that education.16 In the words of Andrew Abbott, a leading
scholar in the field, professions are "organized bodies of experts who
appl[y] esoteric knowledge to particular cases. They ha [ve]
elaborate systems of instruction and training, together with entry by
examination and other formal prerequisites. They normally
possesso and enforce[] a code of ethics or behavior."17
This consensus highlights the centrality of education within a
professional community. Complex "systems of instruction and
training" are not just common to all professions, they are essential
to capture the profession's specialized knowledge, transmit that
knowledge to newcomers, and inform the profession's ethical code.
Participation in an educational community also allows a profession
to maintain a strong boundary between its members and outsiders.
Without a commitment to education, a profession risks dissipation of
its knowledge, diminishment of its membership, and competition
from nonprofessionals.
Building on these insights, Howard Gardner and Lee Shulman
proposed in a prominent symposium that all professions share six
"commonplaces":
a commitment to serve in the interests of clients in particular
and the welfare of society in general; a body of theory or
special knowledge with its own principles of growth and
reorganization; a specialized set of professional skills,
practices, and performances unique to the profession; the
developed capacity to render judgments with integrity under
conditions of both technical and ethical uncertainty; an
organized approach to learning from experience both
individually and collectively and, thus, of growing new
knowledge from the contexts of practice; and the development
of a professional community responsible for the oversight and
16. See Howard Gardner & Lee S. Shulman, The Professions in America
Today: Crucial but Fragile, DEDALUS, Summer 2005, at 13, 14.
17. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 4 (1988). Although
Abbott and other sociologists recognize these common characteristics of
professions, most contemporary sociologists eschew any attempt to draw a firm
line between professions and other occupations. See generally Evetts, supra
note 15, at 134 (summarizing consensus on this point). Some sociologists even
argue that professions have no intrinsic characteristics. Instead, they maintain
that professions are occupational groups that succeed in using the political
process to achieve unusual power, such as self-regulation. See, e.g., James W.
Begun, Economic and Sociological Approaches to Professionalism, 13 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 113 (1986) (describing opposing theories of professions). Despite
these disputes, there is broad agreement that the historic professions of law and
medicine possess the characteristics noted in this Article.
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monitoring of quality in both practice and professional
education. 18
Professionals often focus on the first of these features, stressing
their duty to put clients and society ahead of self-interest. That
obligation is critical for professionals, but the other elements of
Gardner and Shulman's framework contribute equally to our
understanding of professional work. As Gardner and Shulman
recognize, professionals must develop both a "body of theory or
specialized knowledge" and "a specialized set of professional skills,
practices, and performances unique to [their] profession."19  In
addition, they must develop a "capacity to render judgments with
integrity under conditions of both technical and ethical
uncertainty."20 All of these elements, in turn, require an "organized
approach to learning" and "the development of a professional
community responsible for the oversight and monitoring of quality
in both practice and professional education."
21
The cognitive demands of professional practice require a highly
developed educational community. This community nourishes both
newcomers and established members. Newcomers learn the
profession's established theory and practices, while established
members hone their performance. Learning-centered collaborations,
according to Gardner and Shulman, define an occupation as a
profession.
C. Moral Theory
Moral theory also supports a profession's duty to educate. The
legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron, for example, has described a set
of rights that he calls "responsibility-rights."22 These are rights that
depend on the exercise of a designated responsibility. The rights do
not merely call for responsible behavior; they arise to facilitate
responsibilities. The right, therefore, cannot exist without exercise
of the responsibility. 23
Waldron identifies parental rights as a prime example of
responsibility-rights.24 Parents have vast power to control the lives
18. Gardner & Shulman, supra note 16, at 14. Gardner is the John H. and
Elisabeth A. Hobbs Professor of Cognition and Education at the Harvard
Graduate School of Education. Shulman is the Charles E. Ducommun Professor
of Education Emeritus at Stanford University; he is a past president of both the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the American
Educational Research Association.
19. Id. The latter skills, Gardner and Shulman conclude, constitute "the
defining characteristic" of each profession. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id.
22. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1107, 1116 (2011).
23. Id. at 1114.
24. Id. at 1114-15.
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of their children, but their rights exist only to facilitate their
responsibility to care for the child. Parents' rights do not allow them
to act capriciously or maliciously; parents can exercise their
parental rights only to further responsible care. 25
As I have argued elsewhere, many professions reflect a similar
pattern of rights and responsibilities.26 These professions, including
law, receive two valuable rights from society: an exclusive right to
deliver services associated with the profession and the right of self-
government. These rights, like parental rights, exist to facilitate
responsibilities. Society does not grant autonomy to lawyers
because it loves lawyers and wants to give them as much power as
possible. Instead, lawyers have persuaded society that an
autonomous profession will deliver the best results to clients and
other members of society. Lawyers do not just have a right to
practice law and prevent others from doing so; they have a
responsibility to operate their profession in a way that satisfies
society's need for legal services.27
As part of that responsibility-right, lawyers surely have an
obligation to educate new members of their profession. If lawyers do
not perform that role, then who will? Lawyers claim exclusive
rights to practice law and to admit new members to the profession.
If they fail to educate those members, no one else can fill the gap.
The rights to exclusivity and autonomy imply a responsibility to
maintain an ongoing, educated profession.
D. Economic Principles
Economic principles confirm that professionals assume an
ethical duty to educate new members of their profession-at least
when the profession enforces an exclusive right to provide services
to clients. Exclusivity raises prices by foreclosing competition, an
effect economists have documented in the market for legal
services.28 Regulators permit professionals to collect that premium
because they assume that a restricted profession will deliver more
25. Id. at 1115-16.
26. Deborah Jones Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, Responsibility-Rights in the
Legal Profession, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1257, 1257 (2011).
27. Id. at 1262-64; see also James C. Gaa, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Professional Rights and Responsibilities, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS 159, 159 (1990) ("The
basic agreement between a profession and society concerns the degree to which
the profession is allowed by society to govern its own affairs, in exchange for a
commitment to act in 'the public interest."').
28. See CLIFFORD WINSTON ET AL., FIRST THING WE Do, LET'S DEREGULATE
ALL THE LAWYERS 55-56 (2011); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate
Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 653-54 (1981); Benjamin H. Barton, Do
Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 453, 461-63 (2008); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The
Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1694 & n.20 (2008).
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competent, responsive, and efficient services than one that competes
in the open market.
29
This framework, however, rests on the assumption that
professions will invest some of their market premium in assuring
the competence of their members. If the profession does not invest
in its members' expertise, why should society continue to grant the
profession exclusive practice rights? Absent a professional
commitment to ongoing education, the market might better
determine appropriate competence levels and educational programs.
The duty to educate also combats a moral hazard that can arise
among professionals: senior practitioners may hoard expertise in
order to maintain their client base and premium income.
Established practitioners may also tacitly support educational
practices that give newcomers access to the profession without
giving them the expertise that they need to compete with more
senior colleagues. A recognized commitment to educate new
members of the profession can constrain these antisocial practices.
II. THE LEGAL PROFESSION
How has the legal profession responded to the educational
duties described above? Unfortunately, as Subpart IL.A
demonstrates, our rules of professional conduct do not incorporate a
duty to educate new lawyers. Furthermore, as I discuss in Subpart
II.B, both legal educators and practitioners fall short in fulfilling the
duties that their professional status implies.
A. Rules of Professional Conduct
The American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which inform professional responsibility rules
in most states, do not recognize a duty to educate new lawyers.30
The preamble to those rules acknowledges that "[a] s a member of a
learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the
law and work to strengthen legal education."31 That language,
consistent with the authorities discussed above, recognizes the
centrality of education to a profession like law. The rules, however,
fall short of further articulating each professional's duty to
contribute to that education. Only two rules, Rule 1.1 and Rule 5.1,
even approach the topic of education.
29. Begun, supra note 17, at 121.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015). Most states
have adopted rules quite similar to that model code. State Adoption of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications
/model rules oftprofessionalconduct/alpha_liststate-adopting-model
_rules.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.
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Rule 1.1 requires each lawyer to "provide competent
representation to a client," but it does not oblige the profession to
create that competence.32  On the contrary, the rules treat
individual lawyers as autonomous actors responsible for their own
competence. A comment to Rule 1.1, for example, directs that "[t]o
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep
abreast of changes in the law and its practice."33 The rule does not
suggest that the profession has an obligation to maintain
educational avenues to promote that competence.
Other comments to Rule 1.1, in fact, discourage lawyers from
forming the type of professional relationships that might foster
mentoring and collegial education. In theory, a new lawyer could
develop the expertise to represent a client in a novel field "through
the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in
question."3 4  Comments 6 and 7, however, warn that these
associations can generate problems with regard to client
confidentiality, allocation of decision-making power, fee splitting,
and unauthorized practice.35 The rule, in sum, provides little
support for an obligation to educate other professionals.
Rule 5.1(b) treads a little closer to that concept by declaring
that "[a] lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer
conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct."36 Competence is one
of those rules, so a few courts have interpreted Rule 5.1 to require
supervising lawyers to ensure that their junior lawyers are capable
of handling the work assigned to them.3 7 Even that interpretation,
32. Id. r. 1.1.
33. Id. r. 1.1 cmt.; see also id. pmbl. ("A lawyer should strive to attain the
highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to
exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.").
34. Id. r. 1.1 cmt. ("Competent representation can also be provided through
the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.").
35. Id. r. 1.1 cmts. 6-7.
36. Id. r. 5.1(b); see also id. r. 5.1(a) (imposing a similar obligation on law
firm partners and others with "comparable managerial authority in a law firm"
to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct").
37. See, e.g., In re Bradley, 495 B.R. 747, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013)
(stating that the court "may, and will impose sanctions against" a law firm for
failing to "adequately train and supervise" newer attorneys); Att'y Grievance
Comm'n of Md. v. Kimmel, 955 A.2d 269, 286 (Md. 2008) (explaining that
supervising attorneys have a duty in Maryland to make sure employees are not
being assigned work beyond their skill level); Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v.
Ficker, 706 A.2d 1045, 1052 (Md. 1998) (calling it "wholly and inexcusably
inappropriate" for a supervising attorney to hand off a case to a novice employee
one day before trial); see also FDIC v. Nathan, 804 F. Supp. 888, 897-98 (S.D.
Tex. 1992) (recognizing attorney's obligation "to supervise attorneys in his firm
and to deter negligent and unethical conduct" in the context of a malpractice
action). See generally Lucy Isaki, From Sink or Swim to the Apprenticeship:
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however, fails to impose a positive duty to educate new lawyers.
Firms and supervisors can comply with Rule 5.1's standard by
confining new lawyers to routine work rather than educating them
for more sophisticated tasks.
State rules of professional conduct are similarly silent on any
duty to educate new members of the legal profession; I have not
found any state code recognizing that obligation. Despite the
history and theory of professional obligations described in Part I of
this Article, the legal profession does not currently recognize a duty
to educate its new members.38
B. Contemporary Legal Education
Although the legal profession's ethical code does not impose a
duty to educate new members of the profession, the profession
recognizes a practical need to provide that education. Without
education for new lawyers, the profession would wither and society
would find other ways to satisfy its need for legal services. Lawyers,
like other professionals, have thus developed a system for educating
new colleagues.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the legal
profession provided most of that education through apprenticeships.
In the waning years of the nineteenth century, only one-fifth of
practicing lawyers had attended any law school classes before
starting their practice.3 9 Over the course of the twentieth century,
however, lawyers steadily embraced academic preparation for
practice. By 1984, more than ninety-nine percent of all new lawyers
had completed a law school degree.40 In 2014, the most recent year
for which figures are available, only 23 out of 51,180 successful bar
examinees (0.0005%) lacked a law degree.41
Choices for Lawyer Training, 69 WASH. L. REV. 587, 589 (1994) (arguing that
state bars should encourage firms to closely supervise new attorneys); Irwin D.
Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory
Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 268 (1994) (advocating that supervisory
attorneys should have a duty to prevent misconduct by newer attorneys).
38. Curiously, the ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
preceded the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, more explicitly recognized
the profession's obligation to educate new members. Canon 1 declared that "A
Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the
Legal Profession." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (AM. BAR
ASS'N 1980). EC 1-1 provided that "improving the competence of the bar to
meet the highest standards is the ethical responsibility of every lawyer," and
EC 1-2 observed that "the bar has a positive obligation to aid in the continued
improvement of all phases of pre-admission and post-admission legal
education." Id. EC 1-1, EC 1-2.
39. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 41 (1989).
40. Id. at 42.
41. See Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs, 2014 Statistics, 84 BAR EXAMINER,
March 2015, at 8, 13, http://www.ncbex.org/dmsdocument/164 (documenting
that 48,524 successful exam takers had graduated from ABA-accredited law
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Despite the profession's reliance on academic education,
practitioners frequently criticize law school programs. The critics
fault law schools for being too academic, failing to introduce
students to the realities of law practice, neglecting key lawyering
skills, and dodging their duty to educate professionals.42 A growing
chorus of voices suggests that law schools are not adequately
training students for professional law practice.43
Practitioners, meanwhile, have reduced their commitment to
educating new professionals. More than twenty years ago, Judge
Harry Edwards observed, "as law firms have become increasingly
materialistic.., we can no longer count on the law firms to be 'law
schools."' 44  The trend accelerated after the turn of the current
century. As a former BigLaw partner recently lamented, a
"dominant MBA-mentality... forces firm leaders and everyone else
to focus on short-term metrics .... [This] leaves little room (or
time) for the personalized mentoring that turns good young lawyers
into better older ones."
45
We have reached a dangerous point where both law schools and
the bar are neglecting some of their responsibilities to educate new
lawyers. To remedy this problem, educators and practitioners
should renew their commitment to educating new members of the
profession. Consistent with the theme of this Symposium, I will
focus here on changes we could implement within the academy.
schools, 761 had graduated from nonaccredited schools, 1872 had graduated
from foreign law schools, and 23 had prepared through law office practice).
42. Two of the most famous critiques from the bar and bench are SECTION
OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATION CONTINUUM (1992) (popularly
known as the "MacCrate Report"), and Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV.
34 (1992). Widely read critiques have also arisen from legal educators and
other scholars. See, e.g., RoY STUCKEY AND OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION (2007) (authored by Stuckey and other members of the Clinical
Legal Education Association); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) (sponsored by the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching). For an excellent
recent review of these and other critiques, see Sarah Valentine, Flourish or
Founder: The New Regulatory Regime in Legal Education, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 473,
473 (2015) (arguing that law schools should embrace the proposed regulatory
reforms proposed by critics in order to "recenter student learning").
43. See, e.g., Valentine, supra note 42, at 474 ("[T]he criticism has grown
more insistent in the past forty years and recently spilled over into the public
sphere with newspaper articles decrying the failure of law schools to teach
'lawyering,' blogs warning students away from law school, and books touting
one or more failures of the legal academy." (footnotes omitted)).
44. Edwards, supra note 42, at 38.
45. Steven Harper, Where Have All the Mentors Gone?, AM. L. DAILY (July
23, 2010, 11:36 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/07
/harpermentors.html.
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Other thinkers, I hope, will explore complementary reforms within
the practicing bar.
III. HONORING THE COMMITMENT
How can law schools better honor their obligation to educate
new members of the bar? I outline six steps-some with multiple
facets-that law schools should take to honor that commitment.
These steps are merely a start, but I believe they embody some of
the most important reforms that law schools can make.
A. Rethink Admissions and Scholarship Policies
Legal education begins with student selection. A law school's
admissions and scholarship policies affect both classroom learning46
and the composition of the profession.47 There are at least two ways
that schools could enhance their educational programs by adjusting
these processes.
First, schools should stop making admissions and scholarship
decisions with an eye toward influencing their status in the annual
law school rankings published by U.S. News & World Report. This
commercial ranking scheme seduces law schools to choose students
and award scholarships in a way that produces the highest possible
median LSAT score for the entering class.48  Those strategies
undermine our obligation to choose the students who will best
succeed as committed, compassionate, and skillful lawyers.
46. See, e.g., Gregory Androushchak et al., Role of Peers in Student
Academic Achievement in Exogenously Formed University Groups, 39 EDUC.
STUD. 568 (2013); Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on
Complex Thinking in College Students, 15 PSYCH. Sci. 507 (2004)
(demonstrating that heterogeneity in groups of college students promoted
higher level problem solving compared to similar homogenous groups); Amanda
L. Griffith & Kevin N. Rask, Peer Effects in Higher Education: A Look at
Heterogeneous Impacts, 39 ECON. EDUC. REV. 65 (2014) (showing that college
students with lower SAT scores but high grades in high school often have a
positive impact on the first-year performance of their roommates, and that male
minority students receiving financial aid are most strongly affected by their
peers); Sylvia Hurtado, The Next Generation of Diversity and Intergroup
Relations Research, 61 J. Soc. ISSUES 595 (2005) ("Student interaction with
diverse peers during college results in changes in student cognitive, social, and
democratic outcomes by the second year of college.").
47. Law schools do not fully control bar admission; some graduates fail
either the bar exam or character inquiries. It is almost impossible, however, to
pass the bar exam without first obtaining a law degree. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. For that reason, law school admissions decisions have a
profound impact on the shape of the profession.
48. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLS 78, 85 (2012); Jeffrey
Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and
Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 233 (2006).
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An applicant's LSAT score clearly offers important information
about the individual applicant.49 Law schools, however, are giving
those scores an unduly expansive role in both admissions and
scholarship decisions. To maintain a favorable LSAT median,
schools may admit applicants with the desired median score over
applicants with slightly lower scores who show more overall
potential.50  Equally worrisome, schools allot many of their
scholarship dollars to applicants with LSAT scores at or above the
school's median.5 1 These decisions, focused on rankings rather than
student potential, do not serve the interests of society or future
clients. As a result, they violate our commitment to delivering the
best possible education to the profession.
The second flaw in law school admissions lies with schools that
admit applicants with very weak academic credentials. As
applications to law school have dwindled, some schools are
admitting applicants with very low LSAT scores.52 These students
face a high risk of failure, either in school or on the bar exam.53 The
admission of these students during a time of depressed applications,
and without evidence that schools have developed new programs for
preparing at-risk students for bar and practice success, suggests
that schools are placing their own budgetary interests above the
interests of students, prospective clients, and society.
The ABA's accreditation standards for law schools provide that
"[a] law school shall not admit an applicant who does not appear
capable of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education
and being admitted to the bar."54  The ABA should enforce this
standard, which reflects an appropriate commitment to responsible
education.
B. Make Legal Education Intentional
Teachers at all levels have recognized the importance of making
education intentional.55 An intentional educator identifies the goals
49. Stake, supra note 48, at 233 ("There are two reasons for using the
LSAT in law school admissions: it is the best single predictor of first-year
performance, and it can be used to compare English speaking students from any
point on the globe.").
50. Id. at 244.
51. TAMANAHA, supra note 48, at 96-99.
52. 2015 State of Legal Education: An In-Depth Look into Law School
Admissions Choices, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://lawschooltransparency.com
/reform/projects/investigations/2015/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
53. Id.
54. ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH.
2015-2016, Standard 501(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).
55. See, e.g., GRANT WIGGINS & JAY McTIGHE, UNDERSTANDING BY DESIGN
(2005); Michael Kerchner et al., Identifying and Using 'Core Competencies' to
Help Design and Assess Undergraduate Neuroscience Curricula, 11 J.
UNDERGRADUATE NEUROSCIENCE EDUC. A27 (2012).
[Vol. 51414
2016] HIPPOCRATES AND SOCRATES: OBLIGATIONS 415
of a program before choosing courses, materials, or pedagogies.
Neither tradition nor intuition drives intentional education; instead,
educators tailor coursework to carefully articulated goals.5
6
Legal education relies heavily on the traditional wisdom that
intentional educators eschew. Rather than assessing the legal needs
of contemporary clients, the skills required to fill those needs, and
the pedagogies that best build those skills, law schools rely on
curricula and pedagogies that date back to the nineteenth century.
Even when schools innovate, they rarely assess the impact of those
innovations. As a result, we have few guideposts for measuring the
success of our programs--or for improving them.
Several legal educators have called for a more intentional
approach to curriculum design and pedagogic choices in legal
education.57 By following that call, law schools can further their
professional obligation to educate new members of the legal
community.
C. Serve Client and Community Needs
As the educational arm of the legal profession, law schools have
a duty to educate lawyers who will serve the needs of clients and
their communities. A professionally responsible law school
curriculum cannot merely teach the law and skills that professors
want to teach; it must teach the law and skills that the community
needs.
Our traditional law school curriculum focuses overwhelmingly
on appellate advocacy. Students read appellate cases in most of
their courses, write briefs in legal writing classes, and compete in an
ever expanding number of appellate moot court competitions. This
focus persists despite the fact that very few clients need appellate
representation. Instead, those clients seek legal assistance for
transactions, compliance, trial-level disputes, and other types of
legal matters.
The study of appellate opinions and advocacy helps students
hone their ability to analyze legal precedents. That ability,
however, constitutes just one facet of law practice. For real life
clients, facts matter as much as law-and personal goals matter
more than policy considerations. The practicing lawyer has to juggle
all of these considerations simultaneously while also coping with
substantial uncertainty and change. Legal education's myopic focus
on appellate opinions does not prepare students for the realities of a
professional world in which the facts are not given, the parties'
interests are ill-defined, and the client seeks to resolve a personal
56. See WIGGINS & MCTIGHE, supra note 55, at 13.
57. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Preparing for Service: A Template for 21st
Century Legal Education 5 (Univ. Pittsburgh Sch. Law, Working Paper No.
2015-27, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2646931.
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problem expeditiously rather than attempting to change legal
precedent.
Law schools have started to refocus their curricula to recognize
client needs, but there is much more work to be done. One of the
first steps I would take is to develop high quality workshops that
will teach tenured faculty the theory and practice of client
representation. Tenured faculty disdain this work partly because
they do not understand it. If we can teach faculty about client
representation, including the theory that informs different aspects
of that work, we might help them integrate client-service
perspectives into their teaching. At the very least, we might make
them more sympathetic toward the need for client-focused courses
taught by other members of the faculty.
Those "other members of the faculty" should enjoy the same
status and pay as professors who teach primarily appellate doctrine.
Our caste system, which distinguishes tenured faculty from clinical
or writing professors, harms the latter professors and perpetuates a
false dichotomy in legal education. Most important, this
discrimination impairs our profession's commitment to educate new
lawyers. We cannot educate lawyers to serve clients effectively if we
demean the professors providing essential components of that
education.
58
D. Inspire Students to Serve Low- and Middle-Income Clients
The fourth step in reshaping legal education is to inspire
students to serve the low- and middle-income clients that our
profession is failing. Today we graduate more than enough students
to satisfy the legal needs of corporations, law firms, government
agencies, and nonprofits. Low- and moderate-income individuals, on
the other hand, are desperate for legal help.59 One aspect of this
legal-service gap is economic, which I will address in a moment.
Another part, however, stems from the status hierarchy within our
profession.
58. For further discussion of this issue, see, for example, Mary Beth
Beazley, 'Riddikulus!" Tenure-Track Legal-Writing Faculty and the Boggart in
the Wardrobe, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 85-86 (2000); Catherine Martin
Christopher, Putting Legal Writing on the Tenure Track: One School's
Experience, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 65, 68 (2015); Harold Anthony Lloyd,
Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising Langdell: The Inseparability of Legal
Theory, Practice, and the Humanities, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1213, 1244-45
(2014).
59. See, e.g., Ronald S. Flagg, Access to Civil Justice: Keeping America's
Promise, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 571 (2015); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of
Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the (Un)corporate Practice of Law, 38
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 43 (2014); Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Time
of Financial Hardship - A Legal Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45
(2011); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227 (2014).
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Repeated studies confirm a strong status hierarchy among
lawyers.60  Judges and corporate attorneys are at the top.
Government and public interest lawyers are in the middle. Lawyers
who represent low- and middle-income clients in private practice are
at the bottom. The latter are lawyers who handle personal injury
claims, small-asset divorces, personal bankruptcies, home
foreclosures, social security claims, workers' compensation suits,
and immigration defense. These lawyers receive neither the high
pay of corporate lawyers nor the professional appreciation awarded
government and public interest attorneys. As private practitioners,
they do not even qualify for loan forgiveness-even when they earn
less than Legal Aid lawyers.
61
If we want to close the justice gap, assuring that low- and
middle-income clients receive adequate legal services, we need to
overcome this hierarchy. Law schools, which lay the foundation for
professional attitudes, must elevate the status of solo and small-firm
lawyers who offer essential legal services to low- and middle-income
clients. I can imagine many ways to achieve that goal. We could
hire more professors who have served those clients. We could offer
more courses that prepare students for this practice. We could
target scholarship money to students committed to serving
underrepresented clients through private practice. We could
broaden our concept of "public service" work.62 We could fund loan
forgiveness for all graduates who earn low salaries while serving
low- and moderate-income clients.63 We could create incubators for
graduates starting their own practices, and we could organize
networks of alumni practicing in these areas.
6 4
60. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005) (examining the "extremes of the hierarchies that
separate lawyers"); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) (discussing the types of lawyers that
are "clearly identifiable" throughout the legal profession).
61. Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103
CALIF. L. REV. 1561, 1605-06 (2015).
62. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income
Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719 (2001).
63. A few elite law schools include low-earning private practitioners in
their loan forgiveness programs. See COAP Highlights & FAQs, YALE L. SCH.,
https://www.law.yale.eduladmissions/cost-financial-aid/post-graduate-loan
-repayment/coap-highlights-faqs (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (describing Yale
Law School's Career Options Assistance Program); Low Income Protection Plan,
HARVARD L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/deptlsfs/lipp/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2016). Unfortunately, such extensive programs probably would not be
financially feasible at most law schools.
64. During the last five years, several law schools have developed
incubators of this nature. See, e.g., Laura Dym Cohen et al., Launching the Los
Angeles Incubator Consortium, 83 UMKC L. REV. 861 (2015); Tammy M.
Kudialis, A Proposed Model for Creating a Law School Based Solo or Small
Firm Incubator Program, 83 UMKC L. REV. 823 (2015); Cory H. Morris, Access
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Some schools have taken worthwhile steps in this direction, but
we need to address this goal much more explicitly. To fulfill our
promise of "justice for all," law schools must inspire students to
enthusiastically counsel clients about personal injuries, divorces,
foreclosures, social security, workers' compensation, immigration,
and the other legal issues that low- and moderate-income
individuals face.
E. Teach Students How to Deliver Legal Services Efficiently
Inspiration, of course, will not be sufficient to serve the needs of
low- and moderate-income clients. Law schools must also teach
students how to deliver legal services more efficiently so clients can
afford their legal counsel. As professionals, lawyers control both the
content and delivery of their services. Law schools eagerly teach
students content but rarely discuss delivery. Practitioners have
been slow to develop new methods of delivering legal services.
Without effective delivery methods, clients have suffered.
Innovation, however, has finally touched the delivery of legal
services. Online companies have created legal documents for
millions of customers.65 Those companies also allow customers to
obtain answers to simple legal questions quickly and cheaply.66
Innovative law firms have traded brick-and-mortar offices for
virtual platforms that deliver services at reduced prices and greater
convenience.67 Even conventional law firms, government offices,
and nonprofits have adopted practices that streamline the delivery
to Justice, Observations and Thoughts from the Incubator-A New York State of
Mind, 83 UMKC L. REV. 883 (2015).
65. See Anthony Ha, LegalZoom Files for $120M IPO, Saw $156M in
Revenue Last Year, TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012
/05/11/legalzoom-ipo/ (reporting that LegalZoom had served two million
customers by 2012); Rocket LawyerTM Raises $18.5 Million to Fund Rapidly
Growing Online Legal Service, ROCKET LAW. (Aug. 11, 2011),
https://www.rocketlawyer.com/news/article-Series-D-Funding.aspx ("Over 15
million small businesses and consumers have used Rocket Lawyer's easy, web-
based do it yourself tools and legal plans.").
66. See Ask a Lawyer, Avvo, http://www.avvo.com/ask-a-lawyer (last visited
Mar. 16, 2016) (allowing users to obtain online answers from attorneys for free,
or to speak with an attorney by phone for thirty-nine dollars); JustAnswer
Legal, JusTANSWER, http://www.justanswer.com/law/# (last visited Mar. 16,
2016) (allowing users to obtain quick answers to legal questions for a small fee);
Legal Advice in Minutes, ROCKET LAW., https://www.rocketlawyer.com/ask
-a-lawyer.rl (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (allowing users to post short legal
questions and receive responses from online attorneys, without charge).
67. See, e.g., STEPHANIE L. KIMBRO, VIRTUAL LAW PRACTICE: How TO DELIVER
LEGAL SERVICES ONLINE (2d ed. 2015); Timothy J. Clewell, Note, The Attorney-
Client Relationship in the Digital Age, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 451, 451 (2015);
About VLP, VLP L. GROuP, http://www.vlplawgroup.com/About.aspx (last visited
Mar. 16, 2016) (extolling the group's 'low-overhead environment" and use of
cloud services).
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of routine legal services-these changes reduce costs and expand
access to legal services.
68
Legal educators must keep pace with these developments. In
fact, we should work actively with practitioners to develop still
better ways of delivering legal services. Those delivery systems are
as important today as the content we deliver. Every type of client,
from a low-income individual to the largest corporation, is seeking
lower-cost, more efficient legal services. Academic researchers can
help practitioners identify delivery methods that meet those goals
without compromising quality. We can also teach students the
value of new delivery systems, how to use those systems, and how to
continue improving their service to clients.
F. Develop Transferrable Approaches to Learning
The final task for law schools to tackle today is the development
of pedagogies that promote lifelong learning in the workplace. The
teaching methods we use in the classroom create a powerful
template for how graduates will learn-and teach others-in the
workplace. Our stress on the Socratic method, for example, suggests
that this is the most effective way to learn law. Our parsimonious
feedback, similarly, signals that lawyers should be able to learn on
their own, without input from more senior practitioners.
Like other contributors to this Symposium, I question the
effectiveness of these methods on campus. Whatever their value in
law school classrooms, however, these methods are deadly in the
workplace. Senior lawyers sometimes try to "educate" junior ones
by firing questions at them, exposing their ignorance to peers, and
rejecting work with no feedback other than "this won't cut it!" This
behavior should not surprise any of us; the senior lawyers are
simply replaying the educational scripts we gave them in law school.
Few, however, believe that this is an effective way to promote
workplace growth.
What else do our law school pedagogies teach lawyers about
learning? Most of our classes suggest that learning is both
competitive and isolated. We may encourage students to form study
groups, but we test and grade them individually. We also tell
students that they should learn primarily from assigned cases,
eschewing reliance on study aids or other secondary sources. We
68. Richard Susskind reflected on these changes in his provocatively titled
book The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services, which
explores the distinction between "bespoke" legal services and "commoditized"
ones-as well as the inevitable path from one to the other. RICHARD SUSSKIND,
THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 28-32 (rev.
ed. 2010). For a more recent discussion recognizing the value of both
customized and commoditized services, see Alan R. Olson, A New Level of
Strategic Planning: Managing Your Portfolio of Practices, OF COUNSEL, Feb.
2014, at 8.
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certainly do not want them consulting the Internet for help! Yet
study aids, secondary sources, and the Internet provide essential
platforms for exploring new areas of law in practice.
We need to improve our pedagogy-not only to deliver the most
effective education during law school, but also to help graduates
transition to effective workplace learning and mentoring. We
already know that law school cannot prepare graduates for a full
career of law practice. We owe those graduates, accordingly, the
best tools we can provide for extending their own learning and
teaching the lawyers who follow them.
CONCLUSION
Education lies at the heart of every profession. Professionals
must learn the specialized knowledge, skills, and decision-making
strategies of their field, and they must continuously hone their
expertise. To assure continued service to clients and society,
professionals also commit to sharing their expertise with new
members of their community. The promise embedded in the
Hippocratic oath, "[t]hat just as I have learned from those who
preceded me, so will I instruct those who follow me in the science
and art of medicine,"69 applies to all professions. Lawyers have been
slow to recognize the power of this promise, but it is one that can
strengthen both the profession and its clients. In this area, at least,
Hippocrates has much to offer Socrates.
69. EDELSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3.
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